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ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.   
3Neville Sylvester Leslie petitions for review of a final
order of removal of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“Board”), arguing that the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) failure to
advise him of the availability of free legal services, as required
under 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(2)-(3), entitles him to a new
removal hearing under United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). Leslie additionally argues
that his statutory and due process rights were violated by a
deficient Notice to Appear for the removal hearing. For the
reasons that follow, we will grant the petition for review, vacate
the Board’s decision, and remand for a new hearing. 
I.
 
On October 2, 1998, Leslie, a native and citizen of
Jamaica and a lawful permanent resident of the United States,
pled guilty to the felony offense of conspiracy to possess and
distribute 50 grams or more of “crack” cocaine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and was sentenced to 168
months’ incarceration. While serving his sentence, Leslie was
issued a Notice to Appear by the Department of Homeland
Security (“Department”), charging him with being subject to
removal under subsections 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) (aggravated felony
conviction) and 237(a)(2)(B)(i) (controlled substance
conviction) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) & 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The notice was
sent on February 21, 2008, but did not include the time or date
of the hearing. (App. 131.) The notice referred to a “list of
It is not clear from the record precisely when Leslie1
became apprised of the April 16 hearing. According to the
Government, “[b]y virtue of his detention status, [Leslie] was
conveyed to his hearing before the immigration judge on April
16, 2008, and informed of the nature of those proceedings.”
(Resp’t Br. 13.)
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qualified attorneys and organizations who may be available to
represent you at no cost,” which was to be provided with the
notice. Although a checkmark appeared beside the box that read
“Attached is a list of organizations and attorneys which provide
free legal services,” the list does not appear in the administrative
record. (App. 132.)
The record contains a second notice, dated April 8, 2008.
It states the date, time, and place of Leslie’s removal hearing,
but was delivered to “York ICE – Clinton” in York,
Pennsylvania. (App. 129.) The “Legal Services List” box is not
checked. (App. 129.) On April 8, 2008, Leslie was serving his
criminal sentence at Clinton County Prison in McElhattan,
Pennsylania. According to Leslie, he was transported by U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers from Clinton
County Prison to York County Prison on April 15 or 16, 2008.
(App. 118; Pet’r Br. 7.) Leslie appeared before an IJ at York
County Prison on April 16, 2008.  When the IJ inquired if Leslie1
was seeking an attorney, he replied, “I don’t have the money,
Sir.” (App. 115.) The IJ did not explain the availability of free
legal resources, nor did he ascertain whether Leslie had received
Not only is this manifestly incorrect, but the2
Government’s failure to assist the Court in evaluating the
specifics of Petitioner’s argument required the Court to conduct
a special, searching analysis of Petitioner’s contentions before,
during and after oral argument. As to that portion of Rule
31(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, directing an
appellee or respondent to “serve and file a brief within 30 days
after appellant’s [or petitioner’s] brief is served,” we construe
the word “brief” to require that the answering brief address
every relevant, non-frivolous issue presented by the appellant or
petitioner. Litigants should also be mindful of the proper
construction of this term when considering Rule 31(c)’s
directive that an appellee or respondent “who fails to file a brief
5
the “Legal Services List.” The IJ ordered Leslie removed as an
alien convicted of an aggravated felony. (App. 111-113.)
Leslie timely appealed to the Board, which issued a
decision on July 11, 2008, dismissing his appeal. (App. 13-14.)
Leslie filed a petition for review in our Court on July 21, 2008,
and filed a motion to stay his removal on July 24, 2008. On
August 14, 2008, this Court granted his request for a stay of
removal and appointed him counsel.
II.
The Government’s sole argument is that we lack
jurisdiction to review Leslie’s petition under INA section
242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  We disagree. Although2
will not be heard at oral argument unless the court grants
permission.”
“It is well settled that an appellant’s failure to identify or
argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that
issue on appeal.” United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d
Cir. 2005). We make clear that the answering party’s dereliction,
as here, could not constitute a waiver because, in the final
analysis, it is for the Court to evaluate the issues presented by
the appellant or petitioner.
6
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) limits our jurisdiction over final
decisions ordering removal based on the commission of an
aggravated felony or a controlled substance offense, we retain
jurisdiction over constitutional claims and questions of law. See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see also Papageorgiou v. Gonzales,
413 F.3d 356, 358 (3d Cir. 2005). Leslie mounts a two-pronged
attack on his removal hearing. He argues first that his Notice to
Appear was deficient under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i), thereby
denying him a meaningful opportunity to be heard. He argues
next that the IJ’s failure to inform him of the availability of free
legal services, in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(2)-(3),
deprived him both of his constitutional right to due process and
his statutory right to counsel under 8 U.S.C. § 1362. Leslie’s
appeal presents both a question of law – whether an IJ’s failure
to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(2)-(3) is grounds for a
new removal hearing under the Accardi doctrine, and a
colorable constitutional claim – whether his removal order is
7invalid for insufficient notice under the Due Process Clause and
8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). We have jurisdiction over both
claims pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), and we review
both issues de novo, Patel v. Ashcroft, 294 F.3d 465, 467 (3d
Cir. 2002) (superseded by statute on other grounds).
III.
A.
We first address Leslie’s contention that his removal
order is invalid because the IJ failed to comply with regulations
promulgated by the Attorney General to protect his right to
counsel. In particular, Leslie contends that the IJ violated 8
C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(2)-(3), which directs that “[i]n a removal
proceeding, the immigration judge shall” “[a]dvise the
respondent of the availability of free legal services provided by
organizations and attorneys . . . located in the district where the
removal hearing is being held” and shall “[a]scertain that the
respondent has received a list of such programs[.]” Although
allegations of due process violations must ordinarily be
accompanied by “an initial showing of substantial prejudice,”
Khan v. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 236 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation
and quotation marks omitted), Leslie contends that these
procedural rights are protected by the Fifth Amendment and
that, under Accardi, 347 U.S. 260, he need not show prejudice
to invalidate his removal order. It is undisputed that the IJ
violated 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(2)-(3) when he failed to advise
The Government makes no argument that the IJ3
complied with the regulation in question. Nonetheless, we have
reviewed the record and we conclude that the sum total of the
IJ’s colloquy with Leslie regarding his right to counsel is as
follows:
Q. “Mr. Leslie, you have a right to be
represented by an attorney at no expense to
the United States Government. If you want
a lawyer, you must find the attorney
yourself. The Court may not by law
appoint an attorney for you. Do you
understand?” 
A. “Yes.” 
Q. “Are you seeking an attorney?”
A. “I don’t have the money, Sir.” 
Q. “All right. Do you want to proceed and
answer questions of the Court today?”
A. “Yeah, because I, I – I’d become a
National in this country.”
(App. 115.)
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Leslie of the availability of free legal services and neglected to
confirm Leslie’s receipt of the list of these programs.  We must3
9now decide whether the violation of this regulation entitles
Leslie to a new removal hearing without a showing of prejudice.
B.
We begin with the long-settled principle that rules
promulgated by a federal agency that regulate the rights and
interests of others are controlling upon the agency. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 422 (1942).
This doctrine was first applied in an immigration case in
Accardi, where the Supreme Court vacated a removal order of
the Board because the procedures leading to the order did not
conform to the applicable regulations. Accardi, 347 U.S. at 268.
The Board, appointed by the Attorney General, operated under
regulations promulgated by the Attorney General that provided,
in part, that the Board “shall exercise such discretion and power
conferred upon the Attorney General by law.” Id. at 266
(quoting applicable regulations). The petitioner alleged that the
Attorney General had circulated a list of “unsavory characters,”
including Accardi, who the Board then summarily removed
without exercise of its discretion. The Supreme Court held that
as long as the regulation granting the Board broad discretion
remained operative, the Attorney General could not sidestep the
Board or dictate its decision in any manner. Id. at 266-267.
Without requiring the petitioner to show prejudice, the Accardi
Court reversed, holding that Accardi was entitled to a new
hearing before the Board if he could prove his allegations in the
district court. See id. at 268. 
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After Accardi, the Court continued to require agencies to
comply with their promulgated regulations, without requiring
petitioners to make a showing of prejudice. In Service v. Dulles,
354 U.S. 363 (1957), the Court invalidated a Foreign Service
Officer’s national security discharge because the Department of
State failed to comply with regulations granting procedural
safeguards. Acknowledging that the Secretary of State was not
required to adopt the regulations in question, the Court
nonetheless held that, “having done so he could not, so long as
the Regulations remained unchanged, proceed without regard to
them.” Id. at 388. There was no discussion of prejudice to the
terminated employee. Id. at 389. Two years later, in Vitarelli v.
Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-540 (1959), the Court demanded that
the Department of the Interior adhere to its employee-discharge
procedures when terminating an employee on loyalty grounds,
even though the Secretary could have dismissed the employee
summarily on non-loyalty grounds. The Court ordered the
petitioner reinstated without a showing of prejudice. Id. at 546.
Then, in Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963), the Court
held that the failure of a House Committee to comply with its
own rule – requiring the Committee to consider harm to the
witness’s reputation when deciding whether to hold an executive
session – excused the witness’s refusal to answer questions. Id.
at 123-124. With no discussion of prejudice, nor showing of
prejudice apparent on the record, the Court held that the
Committee’s failure to comply with its own rule would
constitute an affirmative defense to the charge of criminal
contempt. Id.
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In American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service,
397 U.S. 532 (1970), however, the Court clarified that not every
promulgated regulation is of such a nature that a violation
should invalidate agency action. There, the Court sharply limited
application of the Accardi doctrine when it imposed an explicit
prejudice requirement to sustain an Interstate Commerce
Commission (“ICC”) award of temporary operating authority,
notwithstanding the ICC’s failure to comply with regulations
requiring applicants to document efforts to obtain service from
other carriers. Id. at 538. Distinguishing Accardi and Vitarelli,
the Court characterized the regulation at issue as a mere
“procedural rule[] adopted for the orderly transaction of
business” in order to “aid the Commission in exercising its
discretion,” rather than a rule “intended primarily to confer
important procedural benefits upon indiv[i]duals in the face of
unfettered discretion.” Id. at 538-539 (quotation and citation
omitted). Applying the “general principle” that an agency may
always relax its own “procedural rules,” the Court held that the
action was “not reviewable except upon a showing of substantial
prejudice to the complaining party.” Id. at 538, 539.
Courts have taken diverse approaches to reconciling the
tension between American Farm Lines and Accardi, some
imposing explicit prejudice requirements, see, e.g., United
States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1979)
(“Violation of a regulation renders a deportation unlawful only
if the violation prejudiced interests of the alien which were
protected by the regulation.”), and others explicitly rejecting a
12
prejudice requirement, see, e.g., Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162,
169 (2d Cir. 1991) (“For these reasons, we hold that an alien
claiming the INS has failed to adhere to its own regulations
regarding the right to counsel in a deportation hearing is not
required to make a showing of prejudice before he is entitled to
relief.”). The requirement vel non of prejudice is at times simply
announced through judicial fiat and at times explicitly reasoned,
based often on the nature of the right implicated by the
regulation. See, e.g., Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d
541, 547 (6th Cir. 2004) (recognizing distinction between
regulations that confer important procedural benefits and those
adopted merely for internal operating procedures); Lopez v. Fed.
Aviation Admin., 318 F.3d 242, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[T]his
court has been careful to distinguish between procedural rules
benefitting the agency (American Farm Lines) and procedural
rules benefitting the party otherwise left unprotected by agency
rules (Vitarelli), as well as cases in which the agency has failed
to exercise discretion required by its regulations (Accardi).”);
Martinez-Camargo v. INS, 282 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2002)
(adopting prejudice standard because it “strikes the proper
balance between recognizing the need for administrative
agencies to follow their own rules with the practical reality that
not every agency violation impacts an alien’s substantive
rights”).
This Court has never explicitly formulated a framework
for determining when judicial relief for a regulatory violation
must be premised upon a showing of prejudice. See Ponce-Leiva
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v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 385 (3d Cir. 2003) (Rendell, J.,
dissenting). We last addressed this question in Chong v. INS,
264 F.3d 378, 389 (3d Cir. 2001), where we required the
petitioner to show prejudice to obtain a new removal hearing
based on the IJ’s violation of 8 C.F.R. § 3.7, which requires an
IJ’s Notice of Certification to the Board to inform parties that
they have the right to make representations before the Board.
We characterized 8 C.F.R. § 3.7 as procedural and agreed with
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that the regulation
was “‘not grounded in any underlying fundamental
constitutional or statutory right.’” Id. at 390 (quoting Waldron
v. INS, 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1993)). The Waldron court
carved out a new rule for rights that are “merely provisions
created by agency regulations,” Waldron, 17 F.3d at 518, by
establishing an explicit framework for determining when
regulatory violations are reversible error: 
[W]hen a regulation is promulgated to protect a
fundamental right derived from the Constitution
or a federal statute, and the INS fails to adhere to
it, the challenged deportation proceeding is
invalid and a remand to the agency is required.
This may well be so even when the regulation
requires more than would the specific provision of
the Constitution or statute that is the source of the
right. On the other hand, where an INS regulation
does not affect fundamental rights derived from
the Constitution or a federal statute, we believe it
We must take this opportunity to rectify a mistake in4
Chong, where we directly quote an erroneous statement from a
Fourth Circuit case – Morgan. See Chong, 264 F.3d at 389-90
(quoting United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 266 (4th Cir.
1999)). We stated in Chong:  
Although the Accardi doctrine originally contemplated
that an agency’s failure to comply with its own rules
automatically would nullify its actions, the Supreme
Court since has “required that claimants demonstrate
prejudice resulting from the violation unless ‘[t]he rules
were not intended primarily to confer important
procedural benefits upon individuals in the face of
otherwise unfettered discretion’ or unless ‘an agency
required by rule to exercise independent discretion has
failed to do so.’” Morgan, 193 F.3d at 267 (quoting Am.
Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532,
538-39 (1970)).
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is best to invalidate a challenged proceeding only
upon a showing of prejudice to the rights sought
to be protected by the subject regulation.
Id. (citation omitted).
Chong stands for the proposition that a violation of a
regulation that does not protect fundamental constitutional or
statutory rights is reversible error only with a showing of
prejudice.  See Chong, 264 F.3d at 389-390. Although we4
Id. (emphases added). The Morgan case’s first use of “unless”
renders its characterization of the American Farm Lines
language erroneous. Under American Farm Lines, 397 U.S. at
538-539, rules intended to provide “procedural benefits upon
indiv[i]duals in the face of otherwise unfettered discretion” can
be “exempt . . . from the general principle” that a prejudice
showing is required. The case American Farm Lines cites for
this proposition, Vitarelli, 359 U.S. 535, confirms this
interpretation. As previously discussed, in Vitarelli, procedural
rules for federal agency discharge proceedings were violated.
Ordinarily, the agency had unfettered discretion to discharge
employees; however, the agency had instituted “procedural
safeguards” where the agency’s reason for discharge was a
concern for national security. Id. at 540. Given the
circumstances, the Court stated that “scrupulous observance of
departmental procedural safeguards is clearly of particular
importance.” Id. The Court did not mention any prejudice
requirement, but instead held that the employee’s dismissal for
national security reasons was illegal given the agency’s
procedural violations. Id. at 545.  
15
might infer that Chong adopted the complete framework set
forth by the Second Circuit in Waldron v. INS, we believe that
Chong cannot serve as a clear-cut precedent for cases in this
Court where the violation of the regulation impinges on
fundamental rights derived from the Constitution or a federal
statute, because it conceivably might be considered obiter
dictum. Nonetheless, Chong is an important stepping stone in
16
the development of the law, and it encourages us in this case to
formulate a framework to serve as guidance on the necessity of
proof of prejudice vel non in both circumstances, to wit, where
an agency regulation (1) is not grounded in any underlying
fundamental constitutional or statutory right and (2) affects
fundamental rights derived from the Constitution or a federal
statute. The teachings of Chong have furnished the answer to the
first set of circumstances. The resolution of this case requires us
to furnish the answer to the second. We are persuaded by
Waldron, and hold that violations of regulations promulgated to
protect fundamental statutory or constitutional rights need not be
accompanied by a showing of prejudice to warrant judicial
relief.
We believe that this rule comports with Accardi and
American Farm Lines. Accardi teaches that some regulatory
violations are so serious as to be reversible error without a
showing of prejudice, and American Farm Lines, 397 U.S at
539, exempts from this principle those procedural regulations
“adopted for the orderly transaction of business.” With these
precepts in mind, we believe a prejudice rule that distinguishes
between regulations grounded in fundamental constitutional or
statutory rights and agency-created benefits successfully carves
out the procedural regulations exempted by American Farm
Lines while honoring Accardi’s insistence that some regulatory
violations are so serious as to merit judicial relief. We agree also
that, absent prejudice, when a violation of immigration
regulations implicates less than fundamental rights, wholesale
17
remand places an “unwarranted and potentially unworkable
burden on the agency’s adjudication of immigration cases.”
Waldron, 17 F.3d at 518.
We take additional guidance from Supreme Court
teachings emphasizing the importance of the root of the
regulation in question when determining appropriate judicial
relief for regulatory violations. In Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,
235 (1974), the Court required the Board of Indian Affairs to
comply with its own internal procedures requiring publication
of all directives regarding assistance-eligibility requirements. In
so doing, the Court noted that “[w]here the rights of individuals
are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own
procedures. This is so even where the internal procedures are
possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required.” Id.
(citing Dulles, 354 U.S. at 388, and Vitarelli, 359 U.S. at 539-
540). The Court later observed in United States v. Caceres, 440
U.S. 741, 749 (1979), that “[a] court’s duty to enforce an agency
regulation is most evident when compliance with the regulation
is mandated by the Constitution or federal law.” Our rule,
dispensing with the prejudice requirement for violations of
regulations that protect fundamental constitutional or statutory
rights, comports with both Morton’s focus on individual rights
and Caceres’s acknowledgment that regulations mandated by the
Constitution or federal law command strict compliance.
Additionally, we note that our sister Courts of Appeals
have generally required stricter compliance with regulations
18
born of statutory or constitutional rights. See Battle v. FAA, 393
F.3d 1330, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“‘[A] court’s duty to enforce
an agency regulation[, while] most evident when compliance
with the regulation is mandated by the Constitution or federal
law,’ embraces as well agency regulations that are not so
required.” (quoting Caceres, 440 U.S. at 749) (quotation and
citation omitted); Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir.
1993); Arzanipour v. INS, 866 F.2d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1989)
(“The failure of an agency to follow its own regulations is not,
however, a per se denial of due process unless the regulation is
required by the constitution or a statute.”). This rule balances the
inherent tension between the well-established deference due
administrative agencies, see, e.g., Chevron v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and judicial oversight of
agency implementation of regulations. “[A]n administrative
agency is not a slave of its rules,” Sun Oil Co. v. Fed. Power
Comm’n, 256 F.2d 233, 239 (5th Cir. 1958), but “[t]he notion of
fair play animating [the Fifth Amendment] precludes an agency
from promulgating a regulation affecting individual liberty or
interest, which the rule-maker may then with impunity ignore or
disregard as it sees fit.” Montilla, 926 F.2d at 164. We believe
that a rule distinguishing regulatory rights that are statutorily or
constitutionally grounded from those that are born purely of
regulations comports with these precepts. 
Although we agree that prejudice need not be shown
when alleged regulatory violations implicate fundamental
statutory or constitutional rights, we reject Leslie’s assertion that
19
the proper standard is set forth in Montilla, 926 F.2d at 169,
where the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an
alien alleging a regulatory violation by the INS need show only
that the subject regulation was for the alien’s benefit and that the
INS failed to comply with it. Leslie fails to note that, just four
years after Montilla, the court in Waldron, 17 F.3d 511, effected
an affirmative retreat from the strong language in Montilla,
limiting that case “to its express terms.” Id. at 517. Waldron
declared that Montilla “may not be interpreted as suggesting an
absolute ‘no prejudice’ standard whenever a challenged
regulation is for the benefit of an alien. Any such interpretation
is unwarranted given the limited holding in Montilla.” Id.
(emphasis in original) (quotation marks omitted). Although a
subsequent case, Picca v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2008),
relied heavily on Montilla’s language, we are unpersuaded that
Picca restored Montilla’s framework. The Picca court applied
Montilla’s approach only after determining that the right at issue
concerned “fundamental notions of fair play underlying the
concept of due process,” and noting Waldron’s conclusion that
an alien’s right to counsel “derive[s] from the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in criminal cases and the Fifth Amendment right
to due process in civil cases.” Id. at 78 (quoting Montilla, 926
F.2d at 167, and Waldron, 17 F.3d at 517).
For the sake of emphasis we repeat: we hold that when an
agency promulgates a regulation protecting fundamental
statutory or constitutional rights of parties appearing before it,
the agency must comply with that regulation. Failure to comply
20
will merit invalidation of the challenged agency action without
regard to whether the alleged violation has substantially
prejudiced the complaining party. 
C.
We turn now to the question whether regulation 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.10(a)(2)-(3), which was indisputably violated in this
case, protects a fundamental statutory or constitutional right,
such that we may order a new removal proceeding without a
showing of prejudice. We hold that it does.
Regulation 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(2)-(3) requires that
“[i]n a removal proceeding, the immigration judge shall”
“[a]dvise the respondent of the availability of free legal services
provided by organizations and attorneys . . . located in the
district where the removal hearing is being held[,]” and
“[a]scertain that the respondent has received a list of such
programs[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(2)-(3). This regulation
derives from 8 U.S.C. § 1362, which provides that “[i]n any
removal proceedings before an immigration judge . . . June 21,
2010, the person concerned shall have the privilege of being
represented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel
. . . as he shall choose.” It is also mandated by 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(b)(4)(A), which commands the Attorney General to adopt
regulations ensuring that an alien “shall have the privilege of
being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel
of the alien’s choosing who is authorized to practice in such
21
proceedings.” It is plain that 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(2)-(3)
protects an alien’s right to counsel at removal hearings, which
is manifestly a statutory right.
This statutory and regulatory right to counsel is also
derivative of the due process right to a fundamentally fair
hearing. See Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 408 (3d Cir.
2005); Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting
that the “statutory right [of aliens] to be represented by counsel
at their own expense” is “an integral part of the procedural due
process to which the alien is entitled” (quotation and citation
omitted)); see also Waldron, 17 F.3d at 517. Aliens in removal
proceedings are entitled to Fifth Amendment Due Process
protection, which guarantees them a fundamentally fair removal
hearing. See Xu Yong Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 131 (3d
Cir. 2001); see also Dakane v. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1273
(11th Cir. 2005); Rosales v. Bureau of Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, 426 F.3d 733, 736 (5th Cir. 2005). A proceeding
may be fundamentally unfair if an alien is prevented from
reasonably presenting his case, Bernal-Vallejo v. INS, 195 F.3d
56, 63 (1st Cir. 1999), and we have held that the right to counsel
is “so fundamental to the proceeding’s fairness that a denial of
that right could rise to the level of fundamental unfairness.”
United States v. Charleswell, 456 F.3d 347, 360 (3d Cir. 2006).
Therefore, although the Fifth Amendment does not mandate
government-appointed counsel for aliens at removal
proceedings, it indisputably affords an alien the right to counsel
of his or her own choice at his or her own expense. Borges, 402
 See also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii); 8 C.F.R. §5
212.2(a) (providing that Attorney General may consent to
readmission twenty years after aggravated-felony removal).
22
F.3d at 408; see also, e.g., Brown v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 346, 352
n.5 (2d Cir. 2004); Baltazar-Alcazar v. INS, 386 F.3d 940, 944
(9th Cir. 2004). Like the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
we “warn[] the [government] not to treat [that right] casually.”
Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir.
1990) (quotation and citation omitted). 
The right to counsel is a particularly important procedural
safeguard because of the grave consequences of removal. In this
case, where removal is predicated on the commission of an
aggravated felony, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), the
draconian and unsparing result of removal is near-total
preclusion from readmission to the United States, with only a
remote possibility of return after twenty years. Under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii), an alien removed after conviction of an
aggravated felony is inadmissible “at any time[.]”  Removal5
“visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the
right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That
deportation is a penalty – at times a most serious one – cannot
be doubted.” Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945). As
Judge Rendell has cautioned, “[w]e must always take care to
remember that, unlike in everyday civil proceedings, the liberty
of an individual is at stake in deportation proceedings.” Ponce-
Our conclusion accords with Picca v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d6
75 (2d Cir. 2008), holding that the regulation specifically at
issue today should be enforced against the government without
regard to prejudice because it concerns the right to counsel,
which is both enshrined in statute and constitutionally derived.
Id. at 78-79; see also  Castaneda-Delgado v. INS, 525 F.2d
1295, 1300 (7th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he right to be represented by
counsel of their choice granted to aliens in deportation
proceedings by statute and regulations is too important and
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Leiva, 331 F.3d at 381 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (quotation
omitted). 
Compounding the grave consequences of removal, many
aliens subject to removal proceedings are unfamiliar with the
complex adjudicatory process by which immigration laws are
enforced. Many courts have recognized that “our immigration
statutory framework is notoriously complex.” E.g., N-A-M v.
Holder, 587 F.3d 1052, 1058 (10th Cir. 2009); see also INS v.
Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 195
(1991) (referencing our “complex regime of immigration law”).
The complexity of removal proceedings renders the alien’s right
to counsel particularly vital to his ability to “reasonably
present[] his case.” Bernal-Vallejo, 195 F.3d at 63. 
Regulation 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(2)-(3) was manifestly
designed to protect an alien’s fundamental statutory and
constitutional right to counsel at a removal hearing.6
fundamental a right to be circumscribed by a harmless error
rule.”). 
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Recognizing the difficulty aliens might have in locating and
accessing counsel, the regulation reflects the agency view that
some aliens may only be able to obtain counsel through low-cost
or free legal services. We can think of no better demonstration
of that difficulty than Leslie’s unrepresented appearance at his
removal hearing and his statement that he could not afford
counsel. Here it was paramount that the IJ comply with §
1240.10(a)(2)-(3)’s mandate to “[a]dvise the respondent of the
availability of free legal services” and to “[a]scertain that the
respondent has received a list of such programs[.]” The IJ’s
failure to apprise Leslie of the availability of free legal services,
as required under the regulations, renders invalid the
subsequently entered removal order, without regard to Leslie’s
ability to demonstrate substantial prejudice.
IV.
Leslie contends additionally that he is entitled to a new
removal hearing because his Notice to Appear was deficient, in
violation of his due process rights and the applicable statute.
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i), an alien is entitled to
written notice of removal proceedings specifying, among other
things, “[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will be
held.” From the record presented, we can conclude that Leslie
was transported from Clinton County Prison to York County
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Prison on April 15 or April 16 and was present for his April 16
hearing at York County Prison. He received, at most, one day of
notice as to the time and place of his removal hearing, and this
notice was perhaps effected only by physical transport from one
institution to another.
Because we grant Leslie’s petition on the basis of the IJ’s
violation of 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(2)-(3), we need not decide
whether this blatantly tardy notice was constitutionally deficient.
Parenthetically, we note that we find it difficult to believe that
a notice, issued under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i), would satisfy
the Due Process Clause without affording an alien adequate time
and opportunity to prepare arguments on his or her own behalf.
Because we grant the petition on other grounds, it is not
necessary to rule specifically in this case that subsumed in the
requirement of notice is a critical timeliness element. See
Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001) (aliens
facing removal are entitled to due process, which includes
opportunity to make arguments on their own behalf). 
V.
Because the regulation at issue, requiring the IJ to inform
Petitioner of the availability of free legal services, protects the
fundamental right to counsel at removal hearings, we will
enforce it without regard to the existence vel non of prejudice
resulting from its violation. It is imperative that the IJ comply
scrupulously with these regulations, promulgated to ensure the
 We recognize the contribution of pro bono services7
rendered by appointed counsel for the Petitioner, and note our
formal appreciation for counsels’ advocacy.
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fundamental fairness of the process by which aliens are
removed. As it is undisputed that the IJ entered Leslie’s removal
order after failing to comply with the requirements of 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.10(a)(2)-(3), we will grant the petition for review, vacate
the order of the Board, and remand for further proceedings in
accordance with the foregoing.7
